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In this provocative book, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi compare the eco-
nomic systems of Europe and the United States, arguing that if Europe does not start im-
plementing some “pro-American” reforms, its relative economic and political power will 
start to diminish. The most important lesson Europe has to learn from the United States 
is that people respond to incentives and that markets are in most cases the best alternati-
ve. The book is divided into an introduction and fourteen chapters. 
In the introduction, authors predict that without pro-market reforms, Europe’s relative 
economic strength will decline, although Europe will maintain a high standard of living. 
They list three reasons why this poses a problem. First, lack of economic power will lead 
to declining political power. Second, individuals’ happiness depends not on their inco-
me as much as on its relation to the income of others. Third, relative decline can lead to a 
“culture of stagnation”, which in turn can lead to absolute economic decline. 
In Chapter 1 Alesina and Giavazzi compare the different social models of the Uni-
ted States and Europe. Americans and Europeans have different values and beliefs. First, 
Americans believe that the poor are responsible for their poverty and should help them-
selves out of their poverty. In contrast, Europeans believe that the poor are trapped in po-
verty so the state should intervene to help them. Also, Europeans value equality much 
more than Americans. In addition, Americans see society as mostly mobile while Euro-
peans see it as mostly immobile. Finally, European societies are ethnically and linguisti-
cally more homogenous. These cultural differences lead to different economic models, 
with Europe having large governments and a lot of government intervention to “impro-
ve” the way markets work. The United States, on the other hand, has a much more mar-
ket-friendly economic system.
Chapter 2 elaborates different approaches to handling ethnic diversity in Europe and 
in the United States. European countries are more ethnically and religiously homogeno-
us than the United States, and endeavour to preserve this homogeneity. This is due to the 
fear that immigrants are taking away the jobs of the locals. In addition, it is believed that 
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solidarity does not travel well across different ethnic and linguistic groups. Thus, it is fea-
red that immigrants will reduce support for the welfare state. But with an aging European 
population, stopping immigration is not a solution. Diversity has good and bad sides. It is 
not a coincidence that the two most diverse US cities – Los Angeles and New York, are 
also centers of business and culture. Instead of restricting immigration, Europe should im-
plement US work permit schemes to balance immigrants with needs of labour market. 
Chapter 3 points out that Europeans value leisure much more than Americans. They 
have lower employment rates, work fewer weeks in a year and fewer hours in the week. 
But this was not always so. Following the devastation of Europe during World War II, 
Europeans worked hard to rebuild their societies and in that time, Europe’s GDP per ca-
pita was converging with that of the US. It started to change in the 1970s, when Europe-
ans started working less and less. 
Even though authors are very critical of European labour markets, they do not wish 
to leave workers entirely to the mercy of the whip of the market. In Chapter 4 they outli-
ne their preferred labour market model, which should have low firing cost, as in the US. 
However, they argue for more substantial unemployment benefits, as distinct from the US 
model, providing that the unemployed are actively searching for a job and are willing to 
go through retraining programs. Their position is much closer to the flex-security labour 
market model of Denmark than the less generous and more laissez-faire US model. Also 
is suggested an interesting method of financing unemployment benefits through a dismi-
ssal tax. Easy firing might lead to moral hazard problems, and this tax is meant to ensure 
that firms will fire only when it is in their long-term interest, while also providing funds 
for unemployment benefits. 
In the last few decades, Europe started to lose ground to the United States. One of 
the reasons is in the character of technological progress, which is the topic of Chapters 5 
and 6. In the early stages, when Europe was far behind the US, it could generate catch-up 
growth through imitation. But once Europe got very near the technological frontier of the 
US, it could no longer use imitation, but had to rely on innovation. And the failure of Eu-
rope in recent decades is a failure of innovation. In order to have innovations, it is vital to 
have excellent universities (Chapter 5) and a business environment with lots of “creative 
destruction” (Chapter 6). In Chapter 5, the authors argue that the reason Europe has infe-
rior tertiary education is not lack of funds but lack of incentives. Equal pay and job secu-
rity for teaching staff eliminates incentives for improvement. Also, European universiti-
es have weaker links with the business world, making research at European universities 
less conducive to economic growth. The European Union is aware that its universities are 
no match for top American universities, and this problem is addressed in Lisbon Agen-
da. But the authors argue that the EU’s educational policies are going to fail because they 
are based on pumping more money into the educational system without changing the in-
centives system. In Chapter 6 they provide three reasons for lack of creative destruction 
– regulations that create rents for incumbents, government subsidies to incumbents and 
weak anti-trust authorities. Without reforms, Europe will continue to be technologically 
behind the US and will not be able to match US growth rates.
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The weakness of anti-trust authorities is the theme of Chapter 7; it prevents market 
competition and creates rents for incumbents. Authors argue that there might be a change 
in the European policies. Industrial policies are in the domain of Brussels, and the Euro-
pean Union has several advantages over member states with respect to reforming Europe’s 
market competition policies. First, the Commission’s decisions do not require government 
approval. Second, it is more difficult for incumbent companies to bribe the EU Commi-
ssioner than a local politician. Finally, Brussels has taken a Big Bang approach, stopping 
member states from helping its failed giants. 
In Chapter 8, the authors argue that Anglo-Saxon common law system is better in en-
forcing contracts than the formal-procedural continental law. Enforceability of law is cri-
tical for trust in contracts; without it contracts are meaningless. The common law system 
gives more discretionary power to judges, while in the civil law judges just follow proce-
dures and forms. The end result is that cases brought to the court are much more quickly 
resolved in Anglo-Saxon countries than in continental Europe. 
In Chapter 9 authors argue that the first-past-the-post electoral system produces law-
makers in Anglo-Saxon countries that respond to crisis quicker. For instance, it took the 
US half a year to respond to Enron, while it took two years for Italian parliamentarians 
to respond to the Parmalat crisis. They also argue against the European practice where 
companies’ supervisory boards are filled with union representatives; which makes it less 
likely to fire employees.
The next three chapters are devoted to the European Union. In chapter 10 authors 
argue that the real opposition in the EU is not between federalists (economic union) and 
intergovernmentalists (political union) but between pro-market and dirigisme groups. The 
European Union was created with the idea of a common market, but so far it applies only 
to goods and not services. Chapter 11 gives a critical overview of the Lisbon Agenda, a 
ten year plan authors claim looks like something that came out of Stalin’s cookbook. It 
sees plan as a solution to every problem. Another potential downside of the Agenda is that 
it could impose the same standards on a diversified set of countries – the UK could gain 
more social protection, while Scandinavian countries could lose some. Finally, the Lisbon 
Agenda is often viewed as a failure and this could lead to setbacks in areas where the EU 
is doing a good job. In Chapter 12 authors defend the euro, claiming that the problem is 
not the currency itself but the lack of reforms necessary to make it work better.
Chapter 13 addresses problems of balancing budgets. Both the US and many Europe-
an countries have issues in keeping their budgets balanced. But the US has fewer problems 
with lowering taxes and government spending than European countries. This is important 
because OECD experience points out that in order to balance the budget reducing gover-
nment spending is better for growth than increasing taxes. Spending is best cut on public 
employment and transfer programs. In addition, a reduction in government spending is 
less likely to lead to a recession, even in the short run, than an increase in taxes.
In the last chapter the authors summarize their conclusions. The problems of Euro-
pe are that its economic system is based on the protection of insiders who are trying to 
maintain their rents. In addition, government is always seen as a solution rather than a 
problem. If Europe is to maintain its economic and political power, it needs to start libe-
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ralizing its products, services and labour markets, allow selected immigration (mimic-
king the US green-card system) and reduce the size of its governments. In one sentence, 
it needs to create a system which will create incentives for Europeans to work hard and 
be innovative. 
Alesina and Giavazzi fall into the category of moderate pro-market economists. They 
believe that markets are the best way of organizing most activities, though not all. They 
acknowledge that health care is not one of those. Still, they cannot be labelled as laissez-
faire economists. Gosta Esping-Andersen in Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism has ou-
tlined three economic models – liberal, conservative and social-democratic. Their argu-
ment is primarily against the conservative model of social economy, which is dominant on 
the European Continent. And although the authors do not try to hide that their affiliation 
is with the liberal model of Anglo-Saxon countries, they rarely argue against the Scandi-
navian social-democratic model. In fact, in some cases they prefer it to the liberal model, 
e.g. higher unemployment benefits conditional on retraining and active job search.
Their economic logic is powerful enough to convince readers that Europe will suffer 
relative economic decline. The biggest problem of this book is their reasoning why Eu-
ropeans should care. The authors admit that Europe will maintain a high standard of li-
ving, but that relative decline matters because Europe’s political influence will dwindle. 
In addition, happiness is going to go down because it is relative in nature – people con-
stantly compare themselves with others. Finally, relative decline can create a culture of 
stagnation, which can lead to absolute decline. The problems with these reasons are the 
following. First, increasing political power is not a very standard goal of economic po-
licy. In fact, some small countries, like Switzerland, have managed to sustain their poli-
tical power on a global level as an impartial mediator precisely they are not involved in 
political power struggle. Second, it is true that people base their happiness on how they 
fare in comparison with others. But I will not compare myself with someone in Somalia 
but with someone in my own society. Therefore, inequality matters for happiness, but not 
so much inequality between but within countries. And it is Europeans that are more con-
cerned about within country inequality than Americans. Thus, the only good reason why 
Europeans should worry about their relative economic decline is the threat of absolute 
decline, which comes with culture of stagnation. But Alesina and Giavazzi just mention 
this as a possibility without even describing the characteristics of the culture of stagnati-
on. And this is a big flaw of this book. In short, this work does a good job of convincing 
reader that without reform Europe will go through relative economic decline, but it does 
not do such a good job in convincing the reader that will be altogether disastrous. 
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